Iran and Biden’s United States

Many books and articles have been written on the US-Iran relationship. Anyways, this issue like other topics in the humanities is fluid and with significant changes according to the in circumstances. It always seems necessary to re-think previous positions. Now that in the recent history of these relations, we see reduction of tensions such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations and the implementation of this nuclear agreement on the one hand and the unprecedented tense time of Trump’s presidency on the other hand, it seems that the analysis of the relationship is not without application in terms of its national and transnational contexts and also from the future research point of view.

Given Joe Biden’s victory in the recent US presidential election and the upcoming presidential election in Iran which could impose new conditions on the ruling party in the region, there have been new tensions and new measures. In this memo, after a brief review of the various levels of this unfriendly relationship, an attempt is made to provide an analysis of the domestic space in Iran and the United States as a basis to approach an approximation of what could potentially be done by different parties.

The theoretical and ideational level:

One of the levels of difficulty in relations between Iran and the United States is the theoretical level. Firstly because of its interests and the position it has gained since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has viewed international relations largely realistically and from a hegemonic point of view and naturally does not want to lose this exceptional position. It is as if there are more modern tendencies within the United States that believe in a new international order and wish to update their country’s position in that order. But these views typically do not go beyond the level of debate and the dominant discourse of politicians in Washington still has a hegemonic view of international relations.

Iran, but on the other hand, for all its diversity among politicians, generally believes in a period of transition in the international arena in such a way that the era of hegemonic and unipolar power is over for the United States. This causes realistic tendencies among the politicians of Tehran to try to increase the influence and scope of Iran’s influence to turn themselves into a hegemonic power in the region and to increase their share in the balance of regional and global power. Other tendencies that are mainly downstream in Iran’s domestic politics should think about international cooperation and promoting the political and diplomatic image of this country in the international arena. It is as if both of these major tendencies share a common denial of the uncontested and hegemonic nature of US power. At the theoretical level, this difference of opinions sometimes becomes a matter of identity and an issue of prestige between the two countries. As a rule with all the differences explained above, the similar tendencies in the two countries have the possibility of more cooperation with each other.

The strategic level:

Relations and problems between Iran and the United States, however, are defined by events such as the coup d’etat of 1953 and the occupation of the US embassy in 1979. But it must be borne in mind that these events today are more symbolic than anything else in history. Therefore what leads to the continuation of differences on both sides is a conflict of strategic interests: The conflict, is mainly due to the alliance of each country with third countries rather than between the two countries. In some cases, Iran and the United States can be considered a ground for political disputes for the other side’s partners:

• Energy security: The fact is that oil and condensate are no longer as vital to the United States today as they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Because now the United States, along with its allies in the region, is the producer and exporter of petroleum products. So even as the most accessible option, the United States is restricting Iran’s oil sales by a regime of sanctions to put pressure on Iran and without being worried about its own and the world’s energy security.
• Geopolitical position: By any analysis of the future, the current US military presence in the Persian Gulf region shows the country’s hegemony in this area. An issue that Iran refuses to accept at any cost due to its vital security and economic needs which the presence of the US Navy in the Persian Gulf and the escalating tensions with the Iranian armed forces confirm.
• Economic benefits: The most important economic benefits that the United States always provides itself through tensions with the Islamic Republic of Iran are the massive arms sales to countries that feel threatened by military actions of Iran and by the way they have a lot of money to spend on this, a phenomenon that is called “Iranophobia” by the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has both created direct US tensions with Iran and is the basis for escalating tensions that may exist on both sides of the Persian Gulf. For Iran, of course, the rise in the level of conflicts with the United States has always been economically costly and especially with the impossibility of free sale of oil and the of a significant increase in its price due to these tensions, its old benefits are no longer conceivable.
• Allies: Partners and allies of the two sides are sometimes the most important elements in fueling the disputes: Saudi Arabia and its satellites, such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, especially after Bin Salman came to power in Riyadh have focused their analysis on regional rivalries that a politically isolated Iran due to its differences with the United States and a potential military threat would give them the upper hand in the competition and what they know about proxy wars — like ones in Yemen and Syria. Saudi Arabia sees itself as a loser in the Eastern Mediterranean conflict including Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and has largely abandoned the area at least ostensibly and put its main focus on trying to gain power by suppressing pro-Iranian Shiites in Yemen.

The other US ally in the region, Israel, also has the highest level of hostilities with Iran. This by itself causes the regime to make every effort, especially the ruling right, to increase the conflict between Iran and the United States. As one of the most obvious aspects of Israel’s rivalry with Iran in the region, not to advance and influence a regime such as is more or less seen in the behavior of Turkey and Saudi Arabia (due to the its lack of capability and legitimacy), rather, it looks at the invasion from the point of view of “maintaining its sovereignty” which due to its historical instability is not recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore is considered by the Israeli regime as “endangered” and “threatened”. In addition to the above we can also mention the tendency of small countries such as the United Arab Emirates to isolate Iran which paves the way for increased economic prosperity and the influx of capital and intermediation in them. All of the above was addressed to the United States’ economic, security and strategic allies, but if we look at Iran’s allies, we also conclude that the proximity of Iran and the United States is not in their favor linearly and with a steep slope: for partners such as China and Russia which are Iran’s allies at the level of the superpowers de-escalate and ensure the non-occurrence of war and military tension which has mainly led to military conflict in the region and whether they become directly or indirectly involved in the field is of strategic value. But from nowhere, the distance between Iran and the United States and even the closed guard and hostile relations that lead to mistrust and the severance of trade and military ties. Iran seems a “low cost partner” and a “customer without many options” for Russia and China. Therefore, due to their need for a proxy presence in the Persian Gulf region, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean on the one hand and energy security for China (As the case decades ago of the United States, it is still fragile and anxious about energy) on the other hand are the most important axes of this crooked position. But perhaps Europe can be seen as the most balanced side in Iran-US relations. On the one hand, Europe is a strategic ally of the United States. Because of its entanglement, economic and security dependence on the US, Europe can pursue its politics and economy neither independently of the United States, nor without regards to its will and interests. On the other hand, Iran is a pristine customer and a potential energy source for Europe which (they may think) if a gap can be made between this country and Russia it can be an actual one. This competitive environment will be of great benefit to major European economies such as Germany. At the same time, the security of Israel and Europe itself, the control of drug transit, the stability of the region, and the control of the refugee issue from the European point of view depend on reducing Iran’s tensions with the region and the United States. So unlike others, Europe is the only side that tries to bring Iran and the United States closer and in this effort, puts as much pressure on both sides as it can. It cannot be denied that the E3’s practical record in defending the JCPOA was not very defensible from Iran’s point of view without the US presence and the only positive point was its balanced position in this regard during Trump’s administration period.

Mid-term relationships level and JCPOA:

The fact is that JCPOA as one of the most exceptional diplomatic actions of the present century was not well received. Iranian nuclear issue, which escalated during Barack Obama’s time, saw on its Iranian side the previous administration and negotiators, who were although trusted by the state as a whole, were not efficient enough to resolve the issue. So what was the result of the consensus of the Democratic government of the United States on the one hand and the isolation and technical inefficiency of the conservative administration in Iran on the other, was the construction of an exceptional building for crippling sanctions whose walls could not be easily torn down.

It took more than two years for Rouhani’s moderate-reformist administration to come into the office in Iran in 2013. Despite the political will and the positive atmosphere of the efforts to resolve the nuclear issue as an acute example of the problems between the two countries, a result based on distrust but accompanied by “cautious optimism” from both sides is reached. The result was again unlucky and after a short time, despite the relative openings and guarantees it had created for both sides, it became the subject of factional rivalries within the United States on the one hand and regional pressures from Saudi Arabia and Israel on the other. Although did not collapse at all, it largely lost its economic and commercial impact due to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States and Iran’s later reduction of compliance to JCPOA.

Now Iran sees Trump’s government coming to an end and the return of the same team that completed the deal. Therefore, the 2020 US election was followed at an exceptional level in Iran, closely and in full detail.

It can be said that the Iranian people, considering their sufferings after the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal and especially the great economic pressures due to lack of trade exchanges and specifically non-sale of oil. As a result of the tenfold increase in the exchange rate, people were divided into several groups (regardless of their political weight that could be obtained by statistical research) and for various reasons they supported each of the two major presidential candidates in Washington:

Iranian Trump supporters which can be divided into four categories:

• Some are the fundamental and traditional opponents of the Islamic Republic and who believe in overthrowing the political system by any means and at any costs. Most of the leaders of this group are abroad and of course their extensions can be traced inside the country. This tendency believes that with “Trump’s maximum pressure” on the Islamic Republic, limited financial resources, its isolation in the international arena and if necessary, even the imposition of war, internal dissatisfaction can be fostered and with the help of hostile governments, the change of system in Tehran can be achieved. They took it as a given fact with the positions adopted by the Trump administration and the imposition of various sanctions against Tehran as well as the protests in 2017 and 2019 in Iran; they felt close to this goal.
• Economic frustrations are mainly composed of some parts of disadvantaged class of the society and it can be assumed that they are probably the social body of the 2017 and 2019 protests in Iran. A part of this class believes that the continuation of the status quo, either with the JCPOA or maximum pressure, does not have a significant impact on their standard of living. Therefore, it can be understood that these groups are probably seeking to disrupt the existing order to achieve a new distribution of resources and facilities. So one way to do this is to disrupt the various pressures that a foreigner government, such as the Trump administration, puts on Iranian government.
• The third group of pro-Trumps Iranians were the affluent class including economic traders who have huge foreign exchange wealth, which has astronomically increased as a result of any sanctions and pressure on it. This group also favored Trump’s remaining and continuing the policy of maximum pressure on Iran. This is the group that President Rouhani referred to as “sanctions businessmen”. That is because of their exceptional position that can circumvent sanctions and enjoy special privileges through them that caused an opaque economic and trade environment.
• The last group of people -in my classification- who wanted votes for Trump in the recent election was the most radicals opposed to the Rouhani administration. They do not want the negotiating team and the JCPOA to gain any credit at any cost. They and evaluate themselves in constant competition with them. The rivalry that ensured his victory in the upcoming presidential election by re-voting Trump and the complete defeat of the Rouhani administration. This category, of course, included both fundamentalist hardliners as well as Ahmadinejad supporters.

The other side of the story, the groups of Iranian people that wanted Biden to win in the election, can also be divided into two main categories:

• Optimist economic activists: Those who hope for economic activity in the true and healthy sense. That is, if foreign policy becomes normal, trade and the economy will benefit from the prosperity and peace of mind of society both in personal life and business. These people include entrepreneurs, manufacturers, ordinary businessmen, technocrats, and professional bureaucrats. In their memory, they go back to the times such as the Reformation(1997–2005) and Rouhani’s first presidency.
• Moderate reformists: Another group of reformist politicians who hope to reform political affairs by overcoming obstacles. These groups are generally political and civil activists with the government from the three sections of moderate reformists (in the style of Mohammad Khatami), moderates in the Rouhani government (in the style of Javad Zarif) and moderate conservatives (in the style of Ali Larijani). From the point of view of this layer of society the main purpose of reform is more efficient governance, detente with the world and economic prosperity and these goals are only possible and desirable if they are achieved at a low cost and logically and reliably. Turning the page and disrupting the social system, especially with foreign intervention, is the red line of this group and basically leads to their greater unity.

It should be noted that among the groups above, which are based on the political principle (i.e. two extremist groups on the one hand and three moderate groups on the other) in dealing with any important political issue including the US elections, they also have a glimpse on the next year’s presidential election in Iran which not only assigns tasks to Iran’s senior management but also impacts the calculations in the face of the West, the United States and the world on the nuclear issue and other issues.

What influences this issue is the nature, speed and manner in which the new administration in D.C. will take a stand and act on the issue of Iran where the subject of all subsequent discussions will be the nuclear issue and the unilateral sanctions imposed by Donald Trump.

Just as Biden’s early and unconditional return to the nuclear deal and the lifting of all Trump sanctions would be in the interest of a dialogue with the West, Trump will continue to make this return conditional on small or large conditions or even calmness and delay (which show that the new government is unreliable in the eyes of Iranians) will give extremists a chance to gain the upper hand in the debate and the presidential election.

The arguments over the issue of JCPOA and its return are, of course, not very audible:

An important question about foreign relations, in general, is whether the change of government in a country will change the strategy of governance in foreign relations. The fact is that the answer is not the same in different countries. But in the case of the United States, the changes in foreign policy that result from the transfer of power from one faction to another today can be said to be significant.

But given the difference, we see in Iran’s political structure and that is the presence of a supreme leader at the helm, sometimes it comes to mind that the decision is made at that head and so it will not make much difference to the people and even to the countries of the other side which government and which approach is in charge. But if we look at the past three decades and the ups and downs of Iran’s foreign relations, we will see that the comparison between the governments of Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani (even though the leadership has been stable during them) has made a significant difference in foreign policies. Or, as a more practical example, the negotiations that took place within the limits of permission by Javad Zarif and reached the deal had been pursued by Saeed Jalili and his team for many years but never reached a conclusion. In other words, Jalili was allowed to negotiate with the P5 + 1, especially the United States and he regularly did so in Baghdad, Istanbul, Almaty, etc. but practically no progress was made. So the negotiator can also make a significant difference in Iran’s foreign policy.

The same is true of the other side: although Iran’s official position on the United States is consistent and largely independent of the White House, the fact is that even the supreme leader at times barred Iran from negotiating specifically with the Trump’s administration and not even consider him worthy of indirect exchange of letters. This was despite the fact the history of direct exchanges between him and Barack Obama as well as very close talks between the foreign ministers of the two countries. Of course, the principled position of countries, including Iran, does not concern the individual and depends on the performance of the other side and the possibility of securing national interests but in practice these changes are what we are looking for in the world of diplomacy as a solution.

One mistake could be to try to continue the old “method” on both sides of the issue: If Iran wants to take the same tactical approach with Biden as it did with Trump. Due to the regional mischief of rivals, internal strife, and the upcoming elections in Tehran, this can even cause more damage, because Trump’s weakness had been his inability to build a consensus is the strengths of Biden and his team.

On the other hand, a strategic mistake by the United States could be the continuation of Trump’s approach to sanctions and therefore make the fulfillment of US obligations under JCPOA and security council resolution 2231 subject to conditions other than those permitted, because logically if Iran wanted to accept non-JCPOA conditions and in fact “buy a horse twice” it would have been done with Trump at his time and he could not bear all these costs to the economy and so on.

It should be noted that although JCPOA was carried out with the idea that other issues between Iran and the United States would be raised and a solution found for them, it is clear that all these hopes have been delayed by the nuclear deal. So it is unreasonable not to pursue them as a reason for the United States to violate the treaty and justify withdrawal from the deal. Also, if issues such as the Middle East region are to be negotiated, all sides would logically benefit from this negotiation. Therefore, the expectation that Iran will comply with the demands of the other side before any negotiations is unreasonable.

Conclusion: What is happening today is more a military-security issue rather than a political-legal game: with the “sense of loss” by extremists on all sides, both official and unofficial — neocons in the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and even radical political groups in Iran — over the outcome of the US election, attempts to disrupt the losing game and bring the issue to the military-security playground have increased. This game is old and exposed but at the same time is possible. Especially with very sharp moves such as the terror that was carried out recently in eastern Tehran, this possibility increases.

Meanwhile, Iran during the Rouhani era has repeatedly shown that its reactions are moderated and not emotional in such scenes and does not fall into the trap of sacrificing its strategic interests. (The three main examples are the sudden departure from JCPOA, the disproportionate reaction to the assassination of General Soleimani, and now the disruptive reaction to the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh). In any case, the loss of Trump and his policy of maximum pressure are major achievements for Iran and that is why strategic patience continues in Tehran. Of course, the other side is aware of the fact that it has raised the level of threat. But at the same time, the authorities in Tehran find themselves more and more justified in distrusting the other side and deserving of a upper hand in any negotiation.

On the other hand, Biden can lead the game to remove obstacles in the long run without threats, haste or condition. This issue requires to build direct and indirect US trust in dealing with Iran so that it clearly and in practice benefits from cooperation. In this case, the nuclear issue is over due to the deal and especially after a considerable period of time of Iran’s compliance until one year after the imposition of sanctions, successful action can be considered a well-established and accepted understanding in case of US return and compliance. But the other two issues that Iran’s opponents are considering, namely the missile and the region, cannot be achieved simply by lifting nuclear sanctions on Iran or by greater threats and pressure.

Regarding the missiles it seems that Iran’s position is largely non-negotiable and what can be taken away from Iran has been already taken away by Iran itself (over 2000km range). Therefore, the West’s concern about not posing a serious threat by Iranian missiles must be pursued in another direction which is ways to resolve tensions and aggressiveness in the region.

Regarding the region, interaction with Iran should not be a matter of retreat because this issue has both the prestige aspect for Tehran and the major security achievements that it will not be easy to hand over. Therefore, it seems that in this regard, Iran is not retreating but trading and cooperating: in the issue of the region, proxy wars and extraterritorial influences are not the only Iranian actors. The United States and Russia are seeking international actors and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and even Israel as major regional players in the region. This scene requires a solution to be sought in a de facto and practical balance between major actors.

Given the mistrust in the United States, the inefficiencies of Europe, the dual game between Russia and China, ambitions of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the region and the security threats from Israel, to turn Iran into a country that is not a security priority and not set such priorities, US would better to start the change from its own approach not Iran’s behavior. A balanced treatment of Iran creates a scene in which those who believe in negotiation would have more to weigh in on the domestic political competition scene. Therefore, a balance at the national, regional and international levels by recognizing Iran’s military, economic and ideational power as well as Iran’s regional position in line with reality and avoiding humiliation or exaggeration from the United States are the only principled solution to ending tensions with Iran and in the region, directly or indirectly. This goal can be initiated by welcoming the Iranian attempt called Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE).